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ABSTRACT
As cyber-physical systems (CPS) become prevalent in ev-
eryday life, it is critical to understand the factors that may
impact the security of such systems. In this paper, we present
insights from an initial study of historical security incidents
to analyse such factors for a particular class of CPS: indus-
trial control systems (ICS). Our study challenges the usual
tendency to blame human fallibility or resort to simple ex-
planations for what are often complex issues that lead to
a security incident. We highlight that (i) perception errors
are key in such incidents (ii) latent design conditions – e.g.,
improper specifications of a system’s borders and capabilities
– play a fundamental role in shaping perceptions, leading
to security issues. Such design-time considerations are par-
ticularly critical for ICS, the life-cycle of which is usually
measured in decades. Based on this analysis, we discuss how
key characteristics of future smart CPS in such industrial
settings can pose further challenges with regards to tackling
latent design flaws.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
Software Engineering [D.2.10]: Design
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1. INTRODUCTION
The role and impact of users on the security of regular IT
systems is a common matter of study in literature. For in-
stance [1, 2] investigate how users’ psychological and cognitive
biases affect security features and discuss how better sys-
tem designs should account for these human characteristics.
These works identify users’ perception as a critical aspect,
including non-malicious behaviours becoming a threat [2].
Industrial control systems (ICS) differ from pure IT sys-
tems that are the focus of such works. Firstly, ICS are
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cyber-physical systems (CPS) that combine regular software
systems with physical ones that control and operate various
sensors and actuators impacting their environment. Secondly,
ICS have a greater diversity of human roles around them,
e.g., operator, technician, maintainer, engineer, manager, etc.
instead of mere “end-user”. Finally, and most importantly,
ICS’ typical life cycle is counted in decades: the interval be-
tween the design and the end of life of a system can span over
50 years. Such long periods leave little room for evolution,
due to stringent availability and safety requirements in a
number of infrastructures, some of them critical – power grid,
water supply, rail network, etc. The design of such systems
is therefore a fundamental step with long-term consequences.
Of course, risk perception has been studied in industrial
contexts [4, 14] and safety has been a central concern in
such settings [6]. However, the increased connectivity of
ICS and the emergent smart CPS settings pose challenges
not just for safety but for security – with security lapses
inadvertently impacting on safety (as our case studies show).
To our knowledge, ours is the first work to undertake a socio-
technical analysis of perception errors underpinning security
issues in CPS.
In this paper, we start by considering the role of ICS oper-
ators’ perception during security incidents. We investigate a
corpus of 6 case studies to analyse how operators perceive
the system and its various parts before and during an inci-
dent. Our investigation reveals that perception errors are
central to all the case studies we investigated. We identify
and classify perception errors and analyse the possible causes
and conditions behind them. We show that, beyond individ-
ual operator mistakes, latent design conditions [13] play a
fundamental role in shaping perceptions, leading to security
issues. Our study offers two key insights:
1. We challenge the idea that humans are necessarily
the weak link via which most incidents occur. We
show that latent design condition are a key factor that
shapes operators’ perception, leading to operational
mistakes and incidents. Our classification of perception
errors provides additional insights regarding different
types of latent design flaws, in terms of system borders,
capabilities, observability and controllability.
2. We discuss how fundamental characteristics of future
smart CPS deployed in such settings can further compli-
cate the early identification and management of latent
design flaws.
Case study Date Description
Maroochy water services 2000 Attack on city water system by rogue employee causing major sewage spillage [11].
Aurora 2007 Proof of concept that cyber attacks can cause physical damage to ICS [10].
Stuxnet 2007 Silent destruction of uranium centrifuges by a computer worm [8].
Turkish pipeline 2008 Destruction of a pipeline by a cyber-commando [3].
Metcalf sabotage 2013 Commando performs a physical attack on an electricity transmission substation [7].
German steel mill 2014 Advanced Persistent Threat caused the destruction of an industrial furnace [5].
Table 1: Case studies analysed.
2. STUDY SETTING
We base our analysis on a corpus of 6 public case studies
summarised in Table 1. The case studies cover a wide range
of systems (single appliances, plants, networks) in different
sectors (energy, oil, water, nuclear, chemical). The Aurora
case is a controlled experiment rather than an actual attack.
Though the Metcalf incident is not a cyber attack, there are
key system security issues involved (operator reactions to
remote alarms and attackers cutting communication cables).
We utilised publicly available data – incident reports, inter-
views, media reports – to undertake a qualitative analysis of
the root causes underpinning the incidents. For our analysis,
we used a combination of grounded theory and incident fault
trees [12] to iteratively develop a theory of cause-effect rela-
tionships across our corpus of case studies. Critical fault tree
elements related to various aspects of each incident were itera-
tively labelled and aggregated into significant categories – the
building and coding of new fault trees reflectively shedding
new light on previous incident analyses until a saturation
point was reached and no new insights or categories emerged.
Mustering six security-related case studies on cyber-physical
systems in industrial settings was a significant effort: public
literature on the topic is scarce and scattered. Consequently,
some case studies are based on limited data. The Turkish
pipeline and Metcalf sabotage cases are based on press ar-
ticles whose accuracy and reliability cannot be ascertained.
The German Steel Mill case has been described in a report
which provides little technical detail about the attack. In
the absence of better information, the stories provided by
these sources must be considered with caution – although
the popularity of these cases makes them interesting per
se as important narratives in today’s security culture in
cyber-physical environments.
3. FACTORS IMPACTING CPS SECURITY
3.1 Classification of Perception Errors
Our analysis leads us to 4+1 categories of perception errors
(cf. Fig. 1 for illustration and Table 2 for examples):
1. Perception of system qualities and capabilities: Oper-
ators having a bad perception of the intrinsic (static)
qualities and capabilities of a system: its safety, its
resilience, etc. They overestimate the capability of
their system to withstand faults and failures in certain
conditions and to stay in an acceptable state while
enduring challenging conditions.
2. Perception of system boundaries: Operators having
a bad perception of the (static) boundaries of a sys-
tem, regarding its environment and neighbour systems.
Misunderstanding the borders of systems – typically
assuming that a system is isolated from another one
whereas it is not, either physically or virtually – leads
to underestimating the possible mutual influences and
knock-on effects between adjacent systems.
3. System observability: Operators incorrectly assuming
that (at time t) they have access to a complete enough
and accurate enough representation of the current state
of their system.
4. System controllability: Operators incorrectly assuming
that (at time t) they are indeed in control of their
system. This perception error is often preceded by an
observability error or bad perception of system capa-
bilities.
The first two categories are horizontal concerns, i.e. re-
garding the system layer itself and other systems around it
(see Fig. 1). These perceptions also concern static properties
of the system that are not supposed to change significantly
in operations: these are therefore related to the design of
the system and the operator’s understanding of this design
a priori. On the other hand the last two categories are ver-
tical concerns, i.e. regarding the interactions between the
system and its operator (system layer vs. organisation layer
in Fig. 1). These are also dynamic factors: whether or not
the operator can observe and control the system depends on
the current state of the system, its sensors and actuators,
its controllers, the type of attack, etc. These are therefore
related to operational contingencies and operator practices
during a particular event.
A fifth category (+1) is that of Attackers actively tampering
with the “observation & control” link between a system and
its operators. A canonical example is Stuxnet: the worm
intercepted both sensor and actuator data, replaying harmless
patterns impersonating a normal behaviour to the operators
while silently tampering with the centrifuge, in a subtle way
that would not be attributed to a malicious attack. In other
words, this category actively alters the vertical concerns with
regards to the properties depicted by the horizontal concerns.
3.2 Influence of Latent Design
Reason [13] identifies two categories of causes for incidents:
• Active failures, which encompass human slips, mistakes
and procedure violations that have a direct, temporary
impact on a system. These acts can generally be ex-
plained by human fallibility, although the conditions in
which active failures happen can also play a catalysing
role. Due to their unpredictability, active failures can
only be detected and identified a posteriori.
Figure 1: Modelling the perception of operators.
• Latent design conditions, which stem from prior de-
cisions from system designers and organisation man-
agement. These conditions can stay undetected for a
long time until they affect the system or its operators.
The effects range from pure system vulnerabilities to
particular conditions shaping operator perception and
leading to active failures. Unlike active failures, la-
tent condition can be identified and mitigated a priori,
before any incident happens.
As can be seen in Table 2, all the perception errors iden-
tified in the case studies proceed from the latter category:
flawed system’s capabilities, porosity in system’s boundaries,
vulnerabilities in system’s observability and controllability
links. Bad latent design is therefore the main driver behind
the key mistakes that ultimately end up in security events.
4. CHALLENGES POSED BY SMART CPS
Latent conditions stem from past design choices that can
prove extremely difficult and costly to mitigate, as they are
related not only to a single person, but to the systems, struc-
tures and organisations around them, and to the integration
between them all. There has been lots of existing work in
the system safety and dependability domains to tackle such
latent design conditions, e.g., [9, 15]. As we can observe in
our case studies, such latent conditions also impact security
in complex cyber-physical systems. One can argue, and as-
sume, that the best practices developed in the dependability
literature can also be utilised to tackle such latent conditions
and mitigate their impact on security. However, smart CPS
– as they become increasingly prevalent in industrial settings,
e.g., Industrial IoT – pose new challenges in this regard:
4.1 Dynamically aggregated nature
Smart CPS environments are expected to be highly dy-
namic, where different sub-systems or intelligent devices can
be aggregated on-the-fly to achieve particular requirements
or goals, e.g., in organisations that enable a Bring Your Own
Device (BYOD) policy. Such a dynamically aggregated set-
ting changes the formerly, largely, static properties of system
qualities and system boundaries – the horizontal dimension
in our model in Fig. 1 – to highly dynamic ones. System
boundaries and neighbouring systems can change often, e.g.,
monitoring systems may be deployed by a regulatory body
during visits to a plant to integrate with existing sensors and
actuators. These dynamically aggregated systems would also
exhibit differing resilience with regards to security, not to
mention the increased connectivity and attack surface that
may arise from multiple systems coming together. This, in
turn, makes it more challenging to understand the system
qualities and boundaries, particularly when the system comes
under attack and operators need to take actions to maintain
its security and safety.
4.2 Autonomous behaviour
Smart CPS, by their very nature, aim to take over vari-
ous functions and hide that complexity from the user while
augmenting the range of possible behaviours for the system.
This impacts the controllability and observability – the verti-
cal dimension in our model in Fig. 1 – as the size of possible
state spaces expands and operators need to rely on possibly
opaque operational details of the industrial processes and
the decision-making logic of their smart controllers. These
factors make it difficult for the operator to perceive what is
going on and take corrective action – all this becoming par-
ticularly challenging if an attacker actively tampers with the
operator’s perception. In addition to the induced cognitive
load, the attack surface and criticality of smart controllers
must be taken into account during the design of such systems.
4.3 Multiple stakeholders
Most current industrial environments, at least those in our
case studies, are systems that are normally under the control
of a single stakeholder. Already we are seeing the emergence
of multi-stakeholder environments in smart grids, intelligent
transportation systems and so on. As future factory sce-
narios come to be implemented, it is not inconceivable to
envisage situations where an infrastructure provider offers
basic facilities including a building management CPS which
are then utilised by multiple other parties for manufacturing
and production, each with their own smart CPS interacting
with shared sensors and actuators. Such a multi-stakeholder
setting impacts all aspects of perception in Fig. 1 as the
overall environment is no longer under the observation and
control of a single operator: system qualities and bound-
aries can change frequently as complex inter-dependent and
overlapping CPS are deployed by different stakeholders.
4.4 From managing latent design to address-
ing emergent design
As we discuss above, the design of smart CPS cannot be
established early on and then evolve at a slow pace over time.
In this context, design is more dynamic and opportunistic
rather than a pre-conception in a designer’s mind. This makes
it challenging to identify and mitigate latent design conditions
as the conditions are not so much latent (they do not arise
from a past design decision) but emergent. Understanding
latent design flaws is still highly relevant in such a context:
whether latent or emergent, the four categories of perception
errors highlighted in this paper can act as a useful basis to
understand and reason about complex CPS configurations
in dynamically aggregated multi-stakeholder settings:
• System qualities and capabilities need to become first-
class elements of system management interfaces, as
Error Category Case Study Details
Capabilities German steel mill Lack of fail-safe mechanisms.
Capabilities Aurora Safety equipment exploited to attack a system.
Boundaries German steel mill Porosity between corporate and control networks.
Boundaries Turkish pipeline Porosity between surveillance, control and corporate networks.
Boundaries Metcalf sabotage Intrusion detection system did not monitor outside the perimeter of the station.
Observability Stuxnet Vulnerabilities in the monitoring system allowed Stuxnet to take control of it.
Observability Turkish pipeline Surveillance camera did not catch intruders and served as an entry point.
Observability Maroochy water services Lack of proper monitoring and alarm systems.
Observability Metcalf sabotage Intrusion detection system did not detect the attackers, only bullet impacts.
Controllability German steel mill Lack of fail-safe controllers.
Controllability Stuxnet Vulnerabilities in the control system allowed Stuxnet to take control of it.
Table 2: Analysis of perception error causes.
operators need constant updates and feedback on their
evolution, depending on changing environments, oppor-
tunistic combinations, stakeholder constraints, etc.
• System borders must be explicit and their modelling
must be refined for operators to understand the possible
direct and indirect interactions of their system with
neighbours.
• The scope of system observation by the operator must
be widened and enriched to include relevant elements in
the environment, dependencies to and from neighbour
systems, as well as potential sources of undesirable side
effects.
• Conversely, system control by operators must define
its exact scope – in terms of direct operator action on
their infrastructure – as well as possible consequences
outside of this scope – in terms of side effects on the
environment and neighbours.
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented an initial analysis and categorisation of
the latent design conditions that impact operators’ percep-
tions in industrial CPS settings, leading to security incidents.
We have highlighted how the key characteristics of smart
CPS will add further complexity to effective management of
such design conditions. This poses a fundamental challenge
for systems engineering but also offers interesting opportu-
nities for novel reasoning frameworks and approaches. Our
future work will focus on such approaches.
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